

9. Civil defence

9.1 A strengthened civil defence

The Government's assessment: Sweden's ability to cope with heightened alert and ultimately war needs to be strengthened on a broad front. An important part of this work is to strengthen civil defence.

The reasons for the Government's assessment: The Defence Commission (Ds 2017:66) notes that crisis preparedness is not dimensioned to deal with an armed attack and the severe hardships of a war. Society lacks many of the resources, capabilities and structures that will be required to deal with the danger of war and war itself. The Government agrees with this assessment and therefore believes that Sweden's capability to handle heightened alert and ultimately war needs to be strengthened on a broad front. An important part of this work is to strengthen civil defence.

Civil defence covers the whole of society, where many actors must collaborate and work on the basis of the goal for civil defence. Creating a strong civil defence is therefore a process that must continue for many years to come. The activities are performed by many different actors: agencies, municipalities, regions, industry and NGOs. This means that this is a complex activity that, based on the Government's governance, needs to be planned and strengthened and that many different processes need to be coordinated. Building capabilities in civil defence, as well as in military defence, involves a very great deal of work and long lead times. Work on planning, knowledge building and capability development needs to be further developed and deepened. During the period 2021-2025, it is important that civil defence capabilities are developed and that concrete steps forward are taken. The Government intends to be clear in its governance in order to provide the actors responsible with good conditions for planning. Civil and military defence reinforce each other. In order to safeguard the balance in total defence, it is important that civil defence is also given priority and continues to develop.

In order to strengthen and further intensify the reconstruction of civil defence, the Government's focus is a step-by-step reinforcement comprising SEK 1 billion in 2021, SEK 1.5 billion in 2022, SEK 2.5 billion in 2023, SEK 3 billion in 2024 and SEK 3.8 billion in 2025.

The breakdown by area for the period 2021-2025 is shown in the table below. The table also shows the amounts added with effect from 2018.

Together with the funds provided in the 2018 budget bill, the total civil defence funding in 2025 amounts to SEK 4.2 billion.

Table 9.1 Summary of funding for civil defence 2021-2025

SEK million

| Area | Previous funding with effect from 2018 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|--|--|------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| Health Care (UO 9) | 40 | 450 | 600 | 1,100 | 1,000 | 1,050 |
| Transports (UO22) | 40 | 80 | 130 | 230 | 330 | 400 |
| Energy supply (UO6, UO21) | 10 | 30 | 40 | 60 | 100 | 200 |
| Financial readiness (UO2, UO3, UO10, UO11) | 0 | 30 | 30 | 40 | 40 | 50 |
| Food and drinking water (UO23) | 40 | 70 | 80 | 100 | 240 | 500 |
| Public order and safety (UO3, UO4, UO6) | 10 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 40 | 50 |
| Organisation and management (UO1, UO6) | 220 | 50 | 200 | 500 | 550 | 600 |
| Psychological defence (UO6) | 0 | 0 | 70 | 90 | 100 | 100 |
| Population protection and emergency services (UO6) | 35 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 80 | 240 |
| Personnel supply (UO6) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 50 |
| Support for the business sector (UO6) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 50 |
| Voluntary defence organisations (UO6) | 24 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 40 | 40 |
| Research and Development (UO6) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 20 |
| Electronic communications and post (UO22)* | 10 | 80 | 120 | 150 | 160 | 180 |
| Cybersecurity centre (UO4, UO6) | 0 | 50 | 60 | 60 | 120 | 150 |

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|--|------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Protective security (UO1, UO2, UO4, UO6, UO21, UO22) | 0 | 100 | 110 | 110 | 120 | 120 |
| Total | 429 | 1,000 | 1,500 | 2,500 | 3,000 | 3,800 |

* In this area, from 2022 onwards, there is an increase in the contributions for financing measures against serious peacetime threats and trying situations related to electronic communications.

The starting points set out for total defence in this bill also apply to civil defence.

The security situation in Sweden's immediate neighbourhood and in Europe has deteriorated. An armed attack on Sweden cannot be ruled out. Nor can it be excluded that military force or threats of this might be used against Sweden. Total defence shall therefore be designed and dimensioned in order to be able to face an armed attack against Sweden, including acts of war on Swedish territory. The starting point for the planning of total defence should be to be able to handle a security crisis in Europe and Sweden's neighbourhood which causes serious disruptions to the functionality of society, as well as war during part of this time, for at least three months.

Climate change is a serious and growing threat to global security and will put a great strain on the world around us and on Sweden, not least because of our geopolitical position as an Arctic state. When the climate changes, it also has consequences for people's living conditions and for many vital societal functions.

The Defence Commission notes that a credible total defence capability, which includes coherent planning, management, preparedness and the necessary resources to deal with war, also improves the possibilities for preventing and handling peacetime crises and conflicts in the world around us, as well as dealing with so-called grey area problems.

The Defence Commission stresses that the development of civil defence should, as far as possible, be based on structures and processes used in crisis preparedness. The Government shares this view. The Government considers that, to the extent that these structures and processes need to be revised based on the experiences of Covid-19, this should be done. The Government wishes to stress that the capability to deal with peacetime crises in society also provides a basic endurance and capability to deal with wartime situations. At the same time, the development of civil defence also strengthens society's capability to deal with severe stressful situations in peacetime. Like the Defence Commission, the Government believes that

robust crisis preparedness means that there are conditions for basic endurance and resilience in society. Total defence resources shall be designed in such a way that they can also strengthen society's capacity to prevent and deal with stressful situations for society. Crisis preparedness and civil defence should therefore be seen as mutually reinforcing. The experiences, structures, processes and working methods that have proved to be appropriate and effective in crisis preparedness are important for the development of civil defence. The structures, processes and working methods that have not proved to be appropriate and which are not sufficient to cope with heightened alert need to be updated during the period 2021-2025.

The Defence Commission has proposed how civil defence should be developed. In February 2019, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and the Swedish Armed Forces presented the Government commission to promote and develop coherent planning for total defence (Fö2019/00198). The Government has subsequently instructed the agencies with specific responsibilities for crisis preparedness and civil defence in most sectors to provide input for the further direction of civil defence, accounting for the feasibility and consequences of the proposals submitted (Ju2019/02477). In some cases, similar issues have been dealt with by Government inquiries.

Part of the work in civil defence is to develop international cooperation. The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment of the importance of cooperation with Finland and Norway. This cooperation should be developed and deepened in a number of areas, such as supply preparedness. Sweden should also, within the framework of the partnership with NATO, continue to deepen cooperation and the exchange of information on civil defence. In order to safeguard the balance in total defence, it is important that civil defence is also given priority and continues to develop.

9.1.1 Civil defence support for the Swedish Armed Forces

Civil defence and military defence need to be developed in a coordinated manner and there should be coherent planning for total defence. Since the interdependence between civil and military defence affects the overall capability of total defence, it is important that endurance and the capability for mutual support is strengthened.

In the event of a threat of war or war, the total defence efforts will initially gather the forces of military defence, while safeguarding the main functions

of society and protecting the civilian population. Society needs to be able to quickly adapt for wartime conditions, to gather forces nationally and to mobilise military and civilian resources that benefit defence efforts.

In civil defence, the actors concerned shall plan to be able to support the Armed Forces during heightened alert and ultimately war. This planning should continue to be developed at both national and regional level. The support needs that are identified in military defence, as well as the ability of civilian actors to meet these needs, are an important part of the planning.

In the event of an armed attack, the civilian population shall be protected, and the vital societal functions safeguarded, even if they cannot be pursued with the same level of ambition as in peacetime. Support shall be provided to contribute to the capabilities of military defence and to strengthen the will to defend and resilience of the population. Civil defence support for the Armed Forces may involve difficult trade-offs, both in an acute situation and in the longer term, in terms of how resources should be prioritised, taking into account society's general needs and the needs of the Armed Forces during heightened alert. It is important that, during the period 2021-2025, work is carried out to develop planning and principles for how priorities are to be set.

9.1.2 Starting points

In accordance with the comments of the Defence Commission, the Government believes that the starting point for the planning of total defence should be to be able to handle a security crisis in Europe and Sweden's neighbourhood, which causes serious disruptions to the functionality of society, as well as war during part of this time, for at least three months. It is particularly important to strengthen resilience in the most important societal functions. This will also develop and strengthen support for military defence.

In most areas, this means that the public sector will not be able to deliver activities or services other than what is judged to be of societal importance for the needs of total defence. On the basis of the Riksdag's decision on this bill, the Government intends to decide on revised instructions for preparedness planning in civil defence. The Armed Forces' defence planning is an important starting point for the overall total defence planning at central, regional and local level. The Government's focus for the Armed Forces defence planning is thus also important for the planning of civil defence. The Government agrees with the Defence Commission's assessment that defence planning needs to be gradually developed in order

to provide a basis for civil defence actors at all levels. The planning framework is also determined based on the resources available. The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that there is a need for performance indicators to assess and follow up developments in civil defence and that the question of how such performance indicators should be designed, as well as their forms, needs to be further analysed. The starting point should be that the results of the analysis should clarify the conditions that apply for planning. This work will be made easier by clarifying the goal for civil defence in this bill.

As a response to the assignment to promote and develop coherent planning for total defence (Fö2017/00688), the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency have developed a model for coherent planning and a coherent evaluation of the state of readiness planning, focusing in particular on civil defence. It is important that the agencies' work on achieving effective planning and follow-up of civil defence continues to develop during the period 2021–2025.

9.1.3 Responsibility, management and coordination in civil defence

The Defence Commission notes that effective and clear conditions for command and responsibility for creating coordination both within civil defence and between military and civil defence are essential for the reinforcement of total defence. The Government shares this assessment. A number of government agencies, in their reports on the continued orientation of civil defence, stress the importance of clarifying responsibility, planning conditions and governance in this area. The Defence Commission makes several proposals regarding conditions for responsibilities and leadership at central, regional and local level and proposes that these shall be further investigated. The Government has appointed an Inquiry on Civil Defence (Ju 2018:05) which will report on its assignment by 1 March 2021 (dir. 2018:79 and 2019:98). The Government intends to decide on a structure for responsibility, command and coordination in civil defence at central, higher regional, regional and local level. Such a structure will also strengthen society's capacity to deal with peacetime crises.

9.1.4 Psychological defence

The deteriorating security situation provides a need for psychological defence that is adapted to today's social conditions and which helps to preserve the free exchange of knowledge and information in an open society. A strengthened psychological defence creates the conditions for

safeguarding an open and democratic society, free expression of opinion and Sweden's freedom and independence, as well as ensuring the people's willingness to defend. Within the framework of civil defence there is a need for Sweden to develop strategic and modern psychological defence capabilities. The Government's approach is therefore to establish an agency for psychological defence in 2022 with the task of leading the work to develop and coordinate Sweden's psychological defence.

9.1.5 Supply preparedness and the role of the industry in civil defence

Swedish supply preparedness should be developed, and the business community should be increasingly involved in safeguarding the most important social functions.

In the event of a threat of war or war, the activities of civil defence will include safeguarding the main societal functions including the necessary supplies, protecting the civilian population and providing support for military defence. To a large extent, private actors own and are responsible for many of the most important societal functions, including the production and transport of essential goods and services. The industry is thus central to total defence and supply preparedness. The involvement of the private business community in the planning process should be increased. Public actors should assess, in close dialogue with private actors, the need for preparation so as to ensure reasonable . This may include prioritising and allocating resources, as well as other necessary measures such as the production or storage of products and materials in areas such as health care and the food chain.

The Government believes that supply preparedness should be able to safeguard as far as possible the flows in the supply chains during peacetime crises, heightened alert and ultimately war. Questions of responsibility and methods for achieving security of supply, such as public or private storage and manufacturing preparedness, are important and complex questions that need to be analysed and further investigated in the coming years. Extensive analysis work on supply preparedness is already underway at a number of responsible agencies. In order to further develop the supply preparedness, the Government intends to appoint an inquiry on what a nationally coordinated supply preparedness should comprise and how it should be organised and financed. Experience from previous solutions should be taken into account in the work. The Government's starting point is that a supply model should be financed by charges, wherever appropriate. As a first step, the Government has commissioned the Swedish Defence Research Agency

to analyse certain general issues of national supply preparedness. The assignment shall be reported on 16 November 2020.

The Defence Commission believes that a national commerce and business council should be introduced in order to establish a long-term interaction between public and private actors at central, regional and local level and to enable the industry's resources to provide for the needs of total defence.

The Government agrees with the Defence Commission's assessment that long-term cooperation between public and private actors at central, regional and local level needs to be established. In several areas, such as transport and health care, work is already underway to develop and clarify cooperation with the industry. The Government believes that this type of cooperation, which occurs by area and sector, needs to be further strengthened. The Government's assignment to the Inquiry on Civil Defence to propose a sectoral division for Government agencies and to propose which agencies should be given special responsibility for emergency preparedness and civil defence should ultimately create good conditions for the work. As a complement to commerce and business councils in different areas of society, a cross-sectoral commerce and business council shall be established during the period 2021-2025 where commerce and industry associations participate in the development of Swedish supply capability in total defence. The Defence Commission considers that the establishment of a commerce and business council should aim at a mutual exchange of information with the task of developing a common approach, plans and conditions for cooperation between public and private actors at all levels. The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment of the need for a commerce and business council for total defence.

9.1.6 Protective security

Protective security is fundamental to our ability to deal with antagonistic threats and to reduce vulnerabilities at all levels of society. The Government agrees with the Swedish Security Service, which has pointed out in its report on the basis for the continued direction of civil defence that well-functioning protective security is the basis for the entire total defence. The Security Service has also repeatedly stated that many actors are failing in their protective security work. Unlike many other areas, there is no possibility for supervisory agencies to impose sanctions on those who fail in their protective security work. There is therefore a great need for an increase in ambition in the area of protective security.

It is also important that security-sensitive activities are protected when exposed to third parties. The Security Service and other agencies have on several occasions noticed that foreign actors are making strategic acquisitions of Swedish operations that should be subject to protection. In addition, the outbreak of Covid-19 means that many companies are struggling financially, which could make them even more vulnerable to acquisition. Real property and other property of importance for Sweden's security may also be the subject of strategic acquisitions. Mechanisms are therefore needed to stop acquisitions that could harm Sweden's security. In autumn 2019, the Government, in light of the Swedish agencies' comments on the existence of strategic foreign acquisitions, set up an inquiry with the task of proposing how a Swedish system for the examination of foreign direct investment in sensitive areas could be designed (dir. 2019:50). The inquiry shall give its final report by November 2021.

In conclusion, the Government believes that protective security needs to be strengthened. The Government has already put forward proposals for legislation that provides for an opportunity to stop transfers of security-sensitive activities and certain property that could harm Sweden's security. In addition, legislation needs to be developed that among other things addresses the need for an increase in the level of ambition in terms of supervision and better protection when security-sensitive activities are exposed to outsiders.

A tightening of legislation in this area should be completed by the end of the period 2021-2025.

9.1.7 Municipalities, regions and county administrative boards

Municipalities, regions and county administrative boards have important roles before and during heightened alert. It is important that these actors are given a good opportunity to participate in the work of reinforcing preparedness.

The Government notes that the focus on important societal functions proposed in this bill also strengthens the work of municipalities, regions and county administrative boards on civil defence. This may include, for example, personnel resources for basic civil defence work, investment support, resources for carrying out training and exercises and the storage of certain supplies and input goods.

The intensified work on civil defence by Government agencies can be expected to create some new conditions for work in municipalities and regions. It is important that municipalities and regions receive support from the agencies in this work. The inquiry on civil defence includes reviewing the requirements for readiness preparations contained in the Act (2006:544) on the measures of municipalities and regions before and in the event of extraordinary events in peacetime and heightened alert. The inquiry also includes assessing the needs of municipalities and regions for possible allocation of resources, based on analysis and proposals for a more uniform and transparent management capability for municipalities and regions.

9.1.8 The supply of personnel in civil defence

The overall need for planned personnel in total defence is the basis for how the supply of personnel should be designed. The present system of personnel supply in civil defence is that those employed on a daily basis in vital societal functions remain in those activities during heightened alert, provided that they are not needed for military defence. Staffing through agreements will also be important for the provision of personnel in civil defence, in particular for voluntary defence organisations' support for agencies, municipalities and regions.

Important steps to ensure the supply of personnel have been taken by means of the agencies with specific responsibilities for crisis preparedness and civil defence placing the personnel needed for activities during heightened alert into the wartime organisation. Municipalities and regions have also begun the wartime placement of their personnel. This work needs to continue. Cooperation between public actors and voluntary defence organisations also needs to be further developed.

The Defence Commission states that heightened alert and war place such demands on civil defence activities that staffing cannot be fully covered with the regular personnel and therefore advocates the activation of civil conscription.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that the personnel needs for civil defence will primarily be met by employed personnel who, in the event of heightened alert, are subject to the general obligation to serve. Volunteers also have an important role to play in the provision of civil defence personnel. Like the commission, the Government believes that the supply of personnel should, as far as possible, be based on the individual's interest, motivation and will. The Government, like the

Defence Commission, notes that situations may arise when the personnel available to employers are not sufficient to maintain the necessary activities.

The Healthcare Readiness Inquiry (SOU 2020:23), The Inquiry on Total Defence Security of Supply (SOU 2019:51) and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Ju2019/03951) propose that the regulations on personnel provision for civil defence should be reviewed. The Healthcare Readiness Inquiry also considers that civil conscription would create increased opportunities for the area's personnel supply in wartime (SOU 2020:23).

The large number of private actors carrying out socially important activities and the deterioration of the security situation over time are two contributing factors to the need for a review of the provision of civil defence personnel. Such a review should include an assessment of the personnel needs that may arise in situations of heightened alert and war. The review should also highlight the question of how this personnel need can be met. The review should take into account previous experience of different staffing solutions. At the same time, consideration should be given to whether such a review of personnel supply should also include a broader threat picture, hybrid threats and serious peacetime crises. The level of ambition in this area needs to be adapted to the additional finance that the Government intends to allocate in 2024 and 2025 for a more secure supply of personnel in civil defence.

9.1.9 Voluntary defence organisations

Voluntary defence organisations are today an important part of society's emergency preparedness and for several years the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's assignments to the voluntary defence organisations have mainly focused on tasks to strengthen peacetime preparedness. Work has begun to complement this approach with a special focus on civil defence, but the Defence Commission believes that more needs to be done to develop activities in this direction. The Defence Commission points out, among other things, that voluntary defence organisations could play an important role in the organisation of population protection, health care, supply preparedness and animal husbandry in the event of crisis and war. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency also assesses in its document with data for the defence resolution period 2021-2025 (Ju2020/00870) that the number of trained volunteers needs to increase during future defence resolution periods.

The Government notes that during the last defence resolution period there has been a development in which the role of voluntary defence organisations in civil defence has begun to be clarified and planned for. This development should continue.

If the economic framework is increased between 2026 and 2030, the funds will be used to implement the measures set out in Section 4 policy focus.

9.1.10 Individual preparedness contributes to a sustainable and resilient society

The Defence Commission considers that each individual should be prepared to cope with his or her own supplies and care for a week without the support of public services. The responsibility of each individual is important, not only for their own safety and security, but also for taking joint responsibility for ensuring that those who most need help from the public services in the event of a serious event can receive that help. The Government considers that in the event of a serious social disturbance or heightened alert and ultimately war, citizens' expectations for social services need to be significantly lower than under normal conditions in peacetime. The Government considers that individuals who do not have an immediate need for assistance in the event of a serious event and who have the conditions and resources to fend for themselves should be able to take responsibility for their own supplies for a week and assist each other as far as possible in solidarity and cooperation with others.

9.1.11 Research and development

The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that Sweden must have research environments available for the needs of total defence. Knowledge building in certain key areas cannot be fully met by open research calls, as these do not provide secure and permanent access to the necessary information over time.

Synergies between civil and military research and development should be sought where these are considered to be relevant and of mutual benefit not only to civil and military defence, but also in the context of total defence.

9.2 Safeguarding the most important societal functions

The Government's assessment: It is particularly important that work to strengthen resilience in the most important societal functions is further developed and deepened. Safeguarding the most important societal functions

includes maintaining necessary supplies. This normally means a lower level of ambition than in a normal peacetime situation. Work has begun but now needs to be further intensified. Efforts to increase resilience, especially in the areas of public order and safety, protection of the civilian population, healthcare, food and drinking water, financial preparedness, transport, energy supply and electronic communications and post, need to be further developed and strengthened.

The reasons for the Government's assessment: Important societal activities are activities that are necessary to ensure that a serious crisis does not occur in society or are necessary or very important to ensure that a crisis that is already occurring does not worsen. For example, in a wartime situation, these may involve activities and functions necessary for military defence or activities and functions necessary to protect the civilian population. Safeguarding the necessary supplies of food, drinking water, energy and pharmaceuticals, as well as access to certain strategic input goods for domestic industrial production and related transport, is essential to maintain the capability of total defence. The Government agrees with the Defence Commission's assessment that, in accordance with the principle of responsibility, all actors in total defence must take responsibility for strengthening preparedness and the capability to also perform activities during a crisis and ultimately in war. This applies to public sector actors as well as to private companies and, ultimately, to individuals.

The Government believes that during the period 2021-2025 it is particularly important that work to strengthen resilience in the most important societal functions is further developed and deepened. Safeguarding the most important societal functions includes maintaining necessary supplies. This normally means a lower level of ambition than in a normal peacetime situation. Work has begun but now needs to be further intensified. Efforts to increase resilience, especially in the areas of public order and safety, protection of the civilian population, healthcare, food and drinking water, financial preparedness, transport, energy supply and electronic communications and post, need to be further developed and strengthened. Cross-sectoral issues should be taken into account where necessary. As shown in Table 9.1 (p. 126), the Government's approach is that additional finance should be allocated to the above areas.

Another part of the work of safeguarding the most important societal functions is to strengthen information security and cybersecurity and reduce vulnerabilities. An important component of this is the establishment of a

cybersecurity centre. The Government believes that a cybersecurity centre will have a concrete impact on Sweden's capability to prevent and handle antagonistic threats. Many of the systems that are critical to maintaining the functionality of society are already vulnerable to disruption in peacetime. Agencies of importance for Sweden's security need to strengthen their protective security.

9.2.1 Public order and safety

The Defence Commission notes that law enforcement agencies, such as the Swedish Police Authority and the Swedish Security Service, have important roles in total defence. The commission further notes that these agencies need to be prepared and trained to deal with antagonistic activities in the context of a major security crisis, thereby contributing to a credible total defence and to creating a deterrent capability. The Government notes that this also includes Swedish Customs and the Swedish Coast Guard.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that planning for a three-month endurance places higher demands on the measures that the agencies need to take than was the case before. The agencies note that such planning generates costs. The Coast Guard, Swedish Customs, the Swedish Police Authority and the Swedish Security Service perform, individually and together with others, activities that form the basis for a society founded on the rule of law. The ability of the agencies to perform over an extended period is therefore important. Building and maintaining greater resilience and endurance is a key measure for the agencies and requires coordinated cross-sectoral planning.

A reinforcement resource for the police

The demands for police activities will increase before and during a war. An adversary will use various means to attack functions, activities and objects that are important to our defence capabilities and can attempt to achieve political and military objectives through sabotage, vandalism or deliberate influence.

A deteriorating security situation, heightened alert and war will also require resources for the monitoring of security objects and other societal important activities. Against this background, the Defence Commission proposes the establishment of a reinforcement resource for the police.

In its documentation to the Government on the continued direction of civil defence, the Police Authority states that the agency has a new national

organisation, an internal reinforcement organisation and the ability to lead, transfer and pool resources where necessary across the country. The Police Authority will also be reinforced by 10,000 police officers by 2024.

The Government considers that further consideration would be needed to identify any needs for protection and reinforcement resources that may exist in a situation of heightened alert and ultimately war from a holistic perspective, as well as how they can contribute in a cost-effective way to the best possible defence capabilities from a total defence perspective. As stated by the Government in the section 8.1.8 The supply of personnel in civil defence, it is important to perform a review of the civil defence personnel supply as a whole, including the possible need for reinforcement resources, including an organisation for reinforcement of the police. In this context, consideration should also be given to whether a reinforcement resource can be based on an obligation placed on recently retired police officers, for example, or those who have transferred to other careers.

Border surveillance in wartime

In peacetime conditions, and also during heightened alert and ultimately war, it is of particular importance that Sweden has control over its borders. The Defence Commission highlights the importance of a functioning structure and planning for border surveillance when there is a danger of war. If the country is in danger of war or such extraordinary conditions exist as are caused by war or by the danger of war, the Government may, pursuant to the Act (1979:1088) on border surveillance in wartime etc., order border surveillance to be organised.

The four agencies the Coast Guard, Swedish Customs, the Swedish Police Authority and the Swedish Security Service have, in their report on the basis for the continued direction of civil defence, jointly highlighted the need for a review of the law on border surveillance in wartime.

Questions concerning the organisation of border surveillance and the status in international law of border surveillance personnel in an armed conflict and otherwise during heightened alert have previously been investigated and discussed in the report Border Surveillance during Heightened Readiness (SOU 2002:4). The question of the need for investigation was raised in an earlier inquiry into the tasks and status in international law of certain personnel in the field of total defence in the report Status in International Law etc. (SOU 1998:123). The two reports have been referred for consultation. Within the Government Offices of Sweden (Ministry of

Defence), a memorandum with a proposal for a new border surveillance law has also been prepared and referred in 2009. The reports and memoranda have been prepared within the Government Offices.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that it is important that there are operational structures and planning for border surveillance when there is a danger of war. Coordinated planning between stakeholders is needed to ensure the possibility of coordinated border surveillance. The Government, like the agencies, believes that the agencies need good conditions to also fulfil their tasks in the event of war and the risk of war. Several of the starting points on which the assessments and proposals in SOU 2002:4 and the 2009 memoranda were based have been amended. The Government therefore intends to file SOU 2002:4 and the 2009 memoranda. Furthermore, there are currently insufficient grounds to depart from the current regulation on the status in international law of certain personnel in total defence in the event of war. The Government therefore intends to also file SOU 1998:123 Work on reviewing the issue of the structure and planning of border surveillance should be able to start during the coming defence policy period 2021–2025.

Measures to respond to hybrid threats across the entire threat scale

Total defence must be designed to be able to face an armed attack. Increased capability and planning are also needed to be able to handle the broader threat from foreign powers that is relevant at all levels of conflict. The area of public order and safety is of particular importance in this context.

The Government stresses the importance of the ability to act together to meet challenges and threats both in peace and in heightened alert. This means being able to use all the security policy instruments available in a coherent manner in order to safeguard Swedish sovereignty and Sweden's interests. It is also important to be able to act in a coordinated manner with others, thereby increasing the cost for those who attack us.

The Government notes that hybrid activities are directed against Sweden today. It cannot be excluded that such threats may be part of an escalating process aimed at undermining the Swedish defence capability in the face of an armed attack, but they may also represent the very heart of a conflict. Hybrid threats in peacetime are directed very much, although not exclusively, at our civil society. Vulnerabilities in civilian structures must be reduced and the peacetime handling of hybrid threats strengthened including a holistic approach. See section 5.1.10 Thematic security issues for the

foreign and security policy aspects of hybrid threats that should be taken into account. Law enforcement agencies have a special role and the emergency response capacity of society is an important part of tackling serious events. Developing intelligence cooperation between the relevant agencies in both military and civil defence is urgent from this perspective.

The Defence Commission believes that the ability to meet the challenges and deal with situations that arise at the borderline between peace and war must be strengthened. The Defence Commission also includes the grey area problem in the underlying conditions for the three-month endurance requirement to respond to and deal with a security crisis in Europe and in our vicinity that leads to serious consequences for the functionality of society. The Government deems it necessary for the responsible agencies to increasingly include the hybrid threat perspective in their planning. The Government also underlines the need for an overall development of the capability to deal with the broader threat pattern and hybrid threats in peacetime. Against this background, there is a need for further analysis on this topic.

9.2.2 Protection of the civilian population

In order to protect the civilian population in the event of an armed attack, targeted measures should be taken and a clear direction and further planning should be established.

Shelters, evacuation and accommodation and the need for a support organisation

The Defence Commission's assessment is that much of the civil defence in terms of protecting the population against the effects of war has been largely dismantled and that there is therefore a need for protection well suited for today's conditions. The Defence Commission also believes that existing shelters should be put in order, but the need varies geographically. Militarily strategic areas should be prioritised and combined with an effective early warning system.

The Government agrees with the Defence Commission's assessment and, with regard to that, the Government's position is that it is important to establish a distinct alignment and a more detailed planning for an effective development of the future protection of the civilian population in the event of heightened alert and ultimately war.

Therefore, the Government intends to give an assignment to a special investigator to review these issues.

Emergency services during heightened alert

The Government agrees with the Defence Commission's assessment that municipal emergency services are an important part of the overall capability for the protection of the civilian population. However, the emergency services of today are essentially dimensioned for tasks in peacetime. Thus, there is a need for more information on how municipal emergency services can safely and effectively deal with different consequences of armed attacks on the civilian population and society in general.

Important Public Announcement

The Defence Commission considers that a functioning shelter organisation requires an effective early warning system. The Government shares the Defence Commission's view. The Government wishes to stress that it is essential to be able to reach out quickly and effectively with Important Public Announcements (known as VMAs in Swedish), so as to protect people, the environment and property in the event of accidents and other serious events in both peace and war. The public must always be able to trust the VMA system.

The VMA system is currently primarily adapted for accidents and serious events in peacetime. The system needs to be better adapted to the present need to be able to alert the public throughout the threat scale.

The Government therefore intends to appoint an inquiry to review the need for more coherent regulation for such information and warning for the public as is to be communicated within the VMA system in both peace and war.

9.2.3 Healthcare

The Government, like the Defence Commission, stresses that it is important to maintain the functionality of healthcare in wartime. If healthcare does not function, this has consequences for people's lives and health.

The Government, like the Defence Commission, wishes to stress that it will not be possible to perform healthcare in the same way in wartime as in normal life and that not all peacetime requirements in legislation will be able to be upheld. Guidance is therefore needed at national level on which care municipalities and regions can de-prioritise and which care should always be

maintained. Civil healthcare services should, in the event of war, have the capacity to provide care that cannot be deferred. Such care shall be ensured for both civilians and military personnel. The priority platform decided by the Riksdag applies when prioritising care needs. Although the general standard of care cannot be the same, medical treatment results for the vast majority of patients should, as far as possible, correspond to the level that is normal in peacetime.

Experiences from the Covid-19 pandemic shall be taken into account in further readiness work.

Healthcare in wartime needs to cover the entire healthcare chain

The Defence Commission proposes that the regions identify at least one existing hospital in each civilian area or military region as emergency hospitals.

Like the Healthcare Readiness Inquiry (SOU 2020:23), the Government considers it is not appropriate to start from the concept of emergency hospitals when describing the capabilities that the region needs to plan for in heightened alert and ultimately war. The capability required is ultimately to maintain certain functions and certain levels of care rather than maintaining the activity in one or more pre-designated physical buildings. What the regions should be able to maintain in wartime is a certain capability to provide healthcare. In some cases, this requires specific medical or technical resources or special skills that are now available in hospitals. Healthcare provided in health centres or in home health care also needs to be covered by the planning. The entire care chain is important because access to hospital beds is affected by whether primary care and municipal health care can cope with their respective tasks. If the municipal healthcare service fails to do its job, patients from there will have to be hospitalised, which risks making it difficult to receive war wounded. Thus, healthcare readiness planning must be done from a broader perspective than trauma care and cover all areas of healthcare, including infection control, primary care and municipal healthcare. The concentration of resources in one or a few places creates vulnerability. The health facilities included in the organisation should be geographically dispersed in order to reduce vulnerability and create redundancy. Planning also needs to take into account the need for durable premises, for example in terms of protective security and provision of water, sewage, heating, electricity and ventilation.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's view that healthcare must be seen as a joint system for the needs of total defence, where military and civilian healthcare need to be able to support each other. For its planning, the civilian healthcare system needs to know what it is expected to do and what the Armed Forces intend to manage on their own. The detailed clarification of what the Armed Forces shall be responsible for follows from the Government's approach to military defence. The interface between military and civilian healthcare needs to be clear, although in practice they will have to work together in many situations. The Healthcare Readiness Inquiry points out that the starting point should be that the Armed Forces should primarily be responsible for all medical care on the battlefield, which means handling both their own and hostile military personnel and wounded civilians, on land and at sea. The Government shares this assessment.

The ability to care for many injured needs to increase

The Defence Commission believes that the capacity in the Swedish healthcare system to be able to reorganise activities in order to take care of a large number of injured must be significantly strengthened.

In order to identify the capabilities of the regions at national level, there need to be common criteria for the capacity that is to be accounted for. The National Board of Health and Welfare, in cooperation with the regions, should, as a matter of urgency and on the basis of common criteria for healthcare facilities during heightened alert and ultimately war, identify and compile information at national level on the healthcare capacity available in the country. With the measures proposed in this bill, the Government believes that during the period 2021-2025 the regions will be able to create the capability to significantly increase the number of physical care places compared to a normal peacetime situation, with staffing and medicines that are available under such conditions.

A reasonable level of ambition should in the long term be to aim towards a doubling of the number of healthcare places.

Furthermore, as part of the work to coordinate and monitor the planning of civil healthcare readiness, the National Board of Health and Welfare should begin work on the development of a national mass casualty plan. Once established, the national plan should form the basis for the efforts of the regions to develop regional mass casualty plans. At the start of the assignment, priority should be given to the development of a national system

for assessing care needs and principles for the distribution of patients between hospitals and regions.

The resilience of healthcare needs to increase

More resilient healthcare in normal conditions creates better conditions for crisis preparedness and for the preparedness that is necessary to also ensure care in the event of war. Digitalisation and the introduction of artificial intelligence into healthcare must take into account the requirements of total defence for resilience and redundancy. At the same time, municipalities and regions need to be prepared to perform the most central tasks during periods without the support of electronic systems. Work on the resilience of healthcare should be coordinated by the National Board of Health and Welfare in cooperation with other stakeholders.

Transportation of patients

The National Board of Health and Welfare, in cooperation with the Swedish Armed Forces and other relevant government agencies, regions and organisations, should plan for how civilian and military transportation of patients shall be coordinated during heightened alert and ultimately war. This should include planning and proposing measures for how the transport of patients can be stepped up in peacetime crises and in wartime.

The personnel are healthcare's most important resource

The availability of trained personnel will be a major challenge for healthcare in peacetime crises and in wartime.

The Healthcare Readiness Inquiry considers that the rules for the provision of personnel in the civil defence healthcare sector need to be reviewed. According to the inquiry, there needs to be clarification of the ways in which municipalities and regions can involve private actors in their wartime organisations, as well as how municipalities and regions can reinforce their organisations with, among other things, personnel from private employers, trained personnel who are not in employment and those under training. These issues need to be seen in a broader context of personnel provision throughout civil defence; see section 8.1.8 The supply of personnel in civil defence.

All the healthcare personnel involved need to be given the necessary education and training to enable the healthcare system to perform its tasks during crisis and war, which may also include any changes to or

simplification of treatment methods. National training in trauma care and war surgery also needs to be reinstated based on the demands of war.

Education and training are needed to achieve an increased knowledge of disaster medicine and the role of healthcare in total defence. The content of the national education and training plan needs to be developed within the framework of the assignment of the National Board of Health and Welfare to support the regions in the provision of knowledge; among other things, a national model for education and training needs to be developed. The assignment shall be reported by 31 December 2020. The Government wishes to stress the importance of making such support to the regions available as soon as possible.

Stockpiling of supplies needs to increase

Safeguarding the necessary supplies of medicines and healthcare materials is essential for the protection of the civilian population and for maintaining the capability of the entire total defence in the event of a serious security crisis or war. The Government, like the Defence Commission, believes that robustness in the supply of medicines and healthcare materials needs to be increased so that the products are available with sufficient endurance over time. Planning and readiness measures taken for healthcare supplies must be carried out on the basis of the care to be provided during peacetime crises and in war. Such measures also need to include planning for infection and health threats. In order to achieve the objective of secured supply, increased the stockpiling of medicines and healthcare materials in Sweden is required. The need for coordination with efforts in other sectors needs to be taken into account in further work.

According to the Government, a nationally cohesive system for stockpiling medicines and healthcare supplies in Sweden for peacetime crises and wars needs to be developed. For reasons of efficiency, such stockpiling is best suited to end-users, in the regular logistics chain. Responsibility for such stockpiling should therefore rest with the ordinary actors. Like the Healthcare Readiness Inquiry, the Government believes that turnover of stock in storage is preferable wherever possible. The Government intends to come back with proposals for such a system during the mandate period. The Healthcare Readiness Inquiry has been commissioned by the Government to submit an interim report by 1 April 2021 with proposals for such a system.

The regions are responsible under current legislation for the existence of medicines and other necessary equipment for the care they are to provide. Therefore, there needs to be some stockpiling of such supplies in the regions in order to reduce vulnerability in normal circumstances. Some regions have already started work on reviewing their inventory.

Like the Healthcare Readiness Inquiry, the Government believes that the regions need to take measures to ensure that the supply of medicines and healthcare materials is sufficient, not only for good care in a normal state of peace, but also to maintain medical disaster readiness.

According to the Health Care Readiness Inquiry, government emergency storage should be expanded to include trauma care products, medical supplies that may be needed in epidemics and some additional antidotes. The Government agrees with this assessment. The Government also shares the assessment of the inquiry that there may be grounds for reviewing manufacturing readiness needs for a limited number of products. Work on manufacturing readiness could take the form of cooperation with neighbouring countries.

There are also issues relating to more efficient use of resources and ensured distribution, including transport, which need to be resolved, such as prioritisation and distribution, as well as distribution via wholesalers and pharmacies. These issues are currently being investigated by the Healthcare Readiness Inquiry. The government intends to return to these matters during the mandate period. The supply of blood also needs to be reinforced. Regional blood operations need to be resilient and develop plans to be able to increase the capacity of the operations to meet the requirements for medical disaster readiness.

9.2.4 Food and drinking water

Both food and drinking water supplies are critical prerequisites for total defence and support all the capabilities of civil defence. The government shares the Defence Commission's assessments and believes that food preparedness needs to be built up in order to safeguard food supplies in the face of a security crisis for at least three months when logistics flows with the outside world are restricted.

Safeguarding food supplies requires the functioning of domestic agricultural and food production, while the flow of goods in the food supply chain needs to continue without interruption. Competitive agricultural and food

companies and a high Swedish market share are important prerequisites. The food sector's critical dependence on input goods and the activities and services of other sectors must also be safeguarded during strained conditions. The Government believes that supply capability should be the starting point for building up food readiness and that drinking water is included. A model describing the supply capability can be a support in the work of building up food readiness and this will be addressed in the assignments the Government intends to submit to the authorities in the food and drinking water sector.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's view that various measures need to be implemented by both private and public actors at central, regional and local level. The work of building up food readiness begins from a low level, since food readiness was largely phased out about 20 years ago. In this context, the individual's readiness to manage his or her own supplies for a week without the support of the public sector is of crucial importance. The Government believes that the work of building up food readiness can begin at the National Food Administration, the Swedish Board of Agriculture and the National Veterinary Institute before the structure of sectoral agencies has been established. The National Food Administration has already been instructed by the Government to investigate by 1 December 2021 which diet meets nutritional requirements in the event of heightened alert.

Measures to start building up food readiness

The Defence Commission believes that the Government needs to specify a direction regarding which methods are to be used to increase food preparedness. The focus should be on an analysis of current societal conditions and the changes that have taken place in food supplies. Finland's food readiness planning may be used as an example. The Defence Commission also considers that food readiness needs to be built up primarily through the stockpiling of necessary foods and that there is a need to store certain strategic goods in storage that is based on stock turnover, in particular those which cannot be secured by deliveries from foreign suppliers or which cannot be produced domestically.

The Government essentially shares the Defence Commission's views on the focus for food readiness, but considers that in-depth analyses of the purpose, content, scope and location of stocks need to be carried out so that any storage under government or private management can be an effective and cost-effective measure. One of the starting points is what domestic

primary production and the processing chain can provide in relation to the diet that needs to be ensured. The Government believes that Sweden will also depend on imports in the event of heightened alert. It is therefore essential to safeguard, as far as possible, trade flows, transport resources and transport infrastructure.

In addition to stockpiling as a method, the Government believes that the capability of business actors to resist disruption needs to be increased. Through cooperation, increased sustainability and secured access to critical resources, actors in the food supply chain can continue operations even during strained conditions. Measures to strengthen the capability of the National Food Administration, the Swedish Board of Agriculture and the National Veterinary Institute to carry out their tasks in socially important activities during heightened alert are also important. Public control in the food supply chain, expert support and laboratory capability are some examples of such important tasks.

Building up supply capability needs questions about how strategic goods can be stored, how our self-sufficiency and industry's resilience can increase, how trade flows can be ensured and how personnel needs can be secured, analysed and managed – so as to ensure a basic supply capability. Competitive agricultural and food companies and a high Swedish market share are important prerequisites for food readiness. The efforts we are making in the field of food in civil defence are creating the conditions for an increased level of food self-sufficiency.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's view that actors at central level in peacetime need to establish a basis for allocation and prioritisation that can be used during heightened alert. If there is a risk of scarcity of supplies over a longer period, the Rationing Act (1978:268) may need to be applied. Before any application of the law, prepared structures should be in place at central, regional and local level in order to implement a rationing decision. The Government therefore considers that structures and procedures for prioritising and distributing food, animal feed and other input goods need to be developed within the framework of future assignments to the relevant agencies.

The Defence Commission believes that at local level municipalities need to agree with private actors and conclude agreements on how food shall be delivered. The National Food Administration, the Swedish Board of Agriculture and the National Veterinary Institute believe that the

responsibility and division of roles in food readiness between municipalities, regions, county administrative boards and central agencies needs to be clarified. The agencies also point to the need for municipalities and regions to identify activities of societal importance and to draw up contingency plans to increase the capability for food supplies in the activities of municipalities and regions. The Government considers it important that municipalities and regions develop their work on food readiness issues, including in connection with the operational responsibility in schools and healthcare.

Measures to ensure access to drinking water in the event of heightened alert and ultimately war

The Government, like the Defence Commission, notes that it is important that municipalities ensure that as far as possible there are backup water supplies that they can use. In order to further strengthen the municipalities' capability to ensure access to drinking water, there may be a need for government reinforcement resources in the form of mobile water works in strategic locations in the country. The Government and the Defence Commission also note that there may be a need to expand the storage of chemicals and spare parts at drinking water producers in order to ensure drinking water production. The National Food Administration should continue to support municipalities in their efforts to ensure the production of drinking water, for example in issues such as access, redistribution and storage of chemicals and also work to standardise equipment and spare parts.

In order to develop the supply of drinking water in the event of crisis, heightened alert and ultimately war, endurance needs to be strengthened and access to spare water supplies, emergency water, auxiliary power and critical resources improved so that the actors in drinking water production can continue to operate even under strained conditions. Municipalities need to practise their crisis planning both internally and in relevant cases with the drinking water producer and the drinking water distributor. This does not affect the existing division of responsibilities between state and municipality. Information and training input by Government agencies at central and regional level is also important to support municipalities in their further work.

The Defence Commission notes that there may be a need to secure the availability of auxiliary power in order to safeguard the emergency water supply. The Government agrees that auxiliary power and also joint reinforcement resources for emergency water equipment contribute to

increased robustness in drinking water production with heightened alert and ultimately war. The Government considers that possible measures that could be considered to support efforts to increase the resilience of drinking water production in the event of heightened alert and ultimately war are investment grants for auxiliary power and an expansion of the joint reinforcement resources for emergency water equipment.

The Defence Commission believes that in peacetime municipalities need to plan in order to be able to perform a prioritisation of drinking water supply and that the county administrative boards may have a role in setting priorities for emergency water between municipalities in the event of heightened alert. The Government believes that the emergency water exercises that the National Food Administration, the Swedish Board of Agriculture and the National Veterinary Institute propose that municipalities should carry out can support the capability to prioritise drinking water. It is also important that the county administrative boards can contribute to the joint planning of drinking water issues during heightened alert and ultimately war. The Government also agrees with the National Food Administration, the Swedish Board of Agriculture and the National Veterinary Institute that the need for water for socially important activities needs to be highlighted and believes that this question should be taken into account in the further planning of civil defence.

9.2.5 Financial readiness

The functionality of the financial system and underlying infrastructures also needs to be maintained in peacetime crises, as well as during heightened alert and ultimately war. The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that the development of peacetime crisis preparedness in the financial sector should be complemented by continued total defence planning and preparations to handle heightened alert and ultimately war. The Government also shares the view that there must be conditions to maintain basic financial transaction possibilities through access to cash, alternative means of payment or some form of Government credits. There must be total defence planning, practised preparations and fallback procedures aimed at also maintaining the basic functionality of the financial system in the event of serious disruption. In order to achieve this, the relevant government agencies should continue their efforts to strengthen readiness so that they can perform their tasks. This means that there must be relevant contingency rules and plans for the provision of personnel in crisis situations and that the international dependencies of the financial sector are taken into account. The

Government believes that there is reason to consider whether legislation relating to the payment system should be updated. The Riksdag has announced to the Government that it will urgently appoint an inquiry to investigate the consequences of digitalisation and the reduction in cash use for the payment market and the roles of the public and private sectors in this market (bet. 2018/19:FiU44 point 1, parliamentary communication 2018/19:293). The Government intends to come back on this issue. The announcement has not been finalised.

The Government notes that the tasks of the government agencies concerned in civil defence are of great importance to other actors: agencies, companies and individuals alike. Some personnel reinforcements may be needed by the relevant agencies to ensure the capability to continue total defence planning and develop the work and further strengthen capability. There is also a need for investment in, among other things, IT infrastructure and premises that further contribute to strengthening capabilities.

9.2.6 Transport

There is a need for increased resilience and redundancy, as well as enhanced protective security, information security and secure communication systems in the transport sector.

The functioning of transport and transport infrastructure is a prerequisite for trade and travel both between countries and within Sweden and thus for Sweden's supply of various goods and services. Basic functionality in the field of transport is also a prerequisite for many other important societal functions to be maintained in times of peace, heightened alert and ultimately war. These include transport for food, supplies of fuel for vehicles and heating, ambulance care, police and other rescue operations. The transport of personnel and goods is also a prerequisite for the Armed Forces' security of supply. Public transport will be important in the event of heightened alert and war, including for evacuation and the transport of war personnel who are reporting for duty.

Division of responsibilities and conditions

The Defence Commission notes that investments will be needed in the future to enable both the adaptation of existing infrastructure and new construction, in order to increase resilience and readiness for war conditions. In order to create endurance during a war or in a situation of hybrid threats where, for example, sabotage is occurring, it is also necessary to have the

ability to urgently repair certain infrastructure in order to enable reasonable functionality in the circumstances. The four monitoring agencies in the field of transport (Swedish Airports and Air Navigation Services, Swedish Transport Administration, Swedish Transport Agency and Swedish Maritime Administration) share the Defence Commission's assessment.

According to the four transport agencies in their presentation of the basis for the continued orientation of civil defence, there is a need for enhanced protective security, information security and secure communication systems based on national coordinated solutions. This includes, among other things, the need to strengthen the protection of traffic management centres and other important facilities. The basic prerequisites for the capability of the four transport agencies to develop civil defence are measures for organisational structure and ensuring a robust IT infrastructure. The proposals in this bill allow for funds to be provided to the agencies in order to begin the work described above.

According to the Swedish Transport Administration, new construction, repair, evacuation and road and track clearing readiness are crucial parts of the agency's ability to repair and maintain a functioning transport infrastructure in the event of social disturbances and heightened alert. This work needs to be based on the needs of total defence for a functional and redundant infrastructure and needs to be done together with the Swedish Transport Administration's contractors. This also illustrates the need for goods and services from industry to meet the needs of total defence. The Government intends to instruct the Swedish Transport Administration to report what is needed in order to achieve appropriate readiness for total defence based on identified needs for e.g. goods/materiel, machinery, skills and contingency plans. The assignment shall also include reviewing the need to use volunteers to improve repair readiness and to take into account experience gained from how such repair readiness has been organised previously (e.g. roads and hydraulic engineering corps).

Since the establishment of the existing system with designated temporary preparedness airports in 2012, there have been changes abroad that have affected the conditions for this type of airports. In December 2019 therefore, the Government instructed the Swedish Transport Administration to carry out a review of the Swedish system with designated temporary preparedness airports and the effectiveness, functionality and appropriateness of the present system. The assignment was completed on 15 June 2020 and is now being prepared within the Government Offices.

Need for transport resources, prioritisation of transport resources etc.

Since many societally important activities in the field of transport are managed and operated by commercial operators, such as private and public limited liability companies, the Defence Commission believes that different forms of cooperation and requirements for private actors should be analysed and developed. In this context, municipally owned airports and ports should also be taken into account. According to the Defence Commission, the Swedish Transport Administration, with the support of other agencies in the transport sector, should lead the work of developing the readiness of the commercial actors. The transport agencies broadly share the Defence Commission's assessment. The Government shares the assessments of the Defence Commission and the agencies and agrees that industry should be increasingly included in total defence planning.

9.2.7 Energy supply

The resilience of energy supply needs to be increased and measures should be taken to ensure a satisfactory level of readiness.

The Defence Commission believes that today's energy supply can largely meet the needs of society in peacetime, but that the energy supply is too vulnerable to withstand an armed attack on Sweden. The Defence Commission considers that stakeholders need to take into account the needs of total defence in the development of new energy systems and in the construction of new energy infrastructure in order to create a more resilient energy supply as a preventive measure. Better information security and cybersecurity, increased redundancy and improved protective security are important in further development.

Svenska Kraftnät (the Swedish power grid), the Swedish Energy Agency and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority have assessed in their documentation for the continued orientation of civil defence that there are a number of general needs for measures to strengthen the capability of different actors. This applies, for example, to the capability of municipalities, regions, county administrative boards and individuals etc. to deal with long interruptions to electricity and heat supplies. There are development needs in terms of society's ability to prioritise and rationing and other consumption suppression in the event of shortages of all types of energy, especially taking into account the needs of total defence. Support for the Armed Forces on energy supply issues needs to be further developed and concretised. The agencies further state that work on total defence planning creates special

needs for resilience at all stages of energy supply, including information security and continuity planning.

The Government shares the assessments of the Defence Commission and the agencies. One of the pillars of energy policy is security of supply. When the energy policy objectives were proposed to the Riksdag, the Government stated that the need for total defence and crisis preparedness for a robust energy supply, especially under disturbed conditions, needs to be taken into consideration in the development of the energy system and in the development of new infrastructure in the energy field (prop. 2017/18:228, bet. 2017/18:NU22, parliamentary communication 2018/19:411). It is important to remember that the individual energy user also needs to be prepared to deal with the consequences of energy supply disruptions both in everyday life and in the event of heightened alert. Reinforcement of the agencies' resources contributes to the development of prioritisation, rationing and other consumption suppression in the event of energy shortages, which also includes the heightened alert perspective.

Electricity supply

The Defence Commission notes that a normal supply of electricity cannot be guaranteed in a war situation. The Defence Commission considers that the fortificatory protection in certain parts of the national grid is still in need of reinforcement, while the commission concludes that it is difficult and costly to obtain full fortificatory protection of the national grid infrastructure. In order to secure the supply of electricity in the event of an armed attack, the Defence Commission states that there will need to be an increased emphasis on independent auxiliary power in contingency planning by the actors responsible for societally important activities. The Defence Commission stresses the importance of having defined procedures and structures for prioritising and rationing in the event of heightened alert.

The Svenska Kraftnät (the Swedish power grid), the Swedish Energy Agency and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority have identified the need for measures in the areas of protection and robustness, repair readiness, micro grids, management and cooperation, as well as cybersecurity. In the nuclear energy field, for example, the present rules need to be clarified with regard to responsibility for safety during heightened alert and the requirements for physical protection at nuclear installations need to be analysed and adapted, since the threat pattern for nuclear power plants during heightened alert is likely to be higher than in peacetime.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's view that normal electricity supply cannot be guaranteed in a war situation and that there is a risk of very large disruptions. The Government notes that there is a need for efforts to strengthen the capacity of electricity supply, such as the ability to operate in micro grids.

Since the national grid is vulnerable, the Defence Commission believes that there may be a need to create better conditions for local production and distribution of electricity. The Defence Commission stresses the importance that the work to develop renewable electricity generation also takes into account total defence aspects. The Government agrees with the Defence Commission's assessment that the transition to renewable electricity should also be able to provide benefits from a total defence perspective and stresses the importance of societal planning taking into account the need for new facilities and new infrastructure.

Fuel supply

The Defence Commission considers that existing storage of oil is sufficient to supply important societal activities even in the event of a security crisis in our region. The Government notes that the need for fossil fuels will be reduced by the transition to renewable fuels in peacetime. However, the need for storage of fuels remains, regardless of whether these are fossil or renewable.

The Defence Commission also considers that actors responsible for societally important activities need to analyse their fuel needs and make the necessary preparations to ensure the availability of fuel. The Defence Commission believes that a planning requirement should be imposed on societally important actors whose activities depend on fuel. Requirements should be imposed on private fuel actors to increase stockpiling of fuels at regional and local level. The Defence Commission also stresses the importance that, in peacetime, there must also be a defined national system for prioritising fuel. The Defence Commission notes that the development of alternative fuels reduces vulnerabilities and mitigates the consequences of disturbances.

The Swedish Energy Agency has identified a number of development and investigation needs in its role as the agency responsibility for oil and fuel readiness, including prioritisation of fuels. The Government agrees that fuel readiness needs to be developed for adaptation to total defence and the energy transition.

The Defence Commission notes that the development of alternative fuels reduces vulnerabilities and mitigates the consequences of disturbances. The Swedish Energy Agency has stated that Sweden is also dependent on imports for the majority of biofuel consumption and that it is important to develop and safeguard fuel storage systems.

Provision of district heating and district cooling

The Defence Commission notes that interruptions to district heating can have very significant consequences and that the endurance of the district heating supply needs to be strengthened with a focus on, among other things, functional requirements for suppliers and various preventive measures for handling vulnerabilities in the supply of district heating. The Defence Commission also notes that municipalities and, if possible, individual households need to be able to handle interruptions to district heating supply.

The Government notes that the supply of district cooling is also an important aspect for the functionality of society. Interruptions to district cooling can affect, for example, server halls and the functionality of healthcare. The Government agrees that readiness in district heating and cooling can be improved. The individual energy user, in turn, also needs to be prepared to deal with the consequences of disturbances both in everyday life and in the event of heightened alert. Unlike disruptions in electricity supply that often have a direct impact in society, interruptions in the supply of district heating or cooling usually have a more delayed effect.

9.2.8 Electronic communications and post

The robustness of electronic communications and post needs to be increased and measures need to be taken to ensure that the activities that society needs can be performed sustainably and to achieve the highest possible total defence capability.

The Defence Commission stresses the importance of electronic communications for the functionality of society, but at the same time points out that electronic communications systems are not designed to cope with the pressures of war or the risk of war. The Government considers that the work of the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority (PTS) to strengthen robustness is important and considers that measures need to be taken in this area to reinforce the capacity for crisis preparedness, as well as the capability to cope with heightened alert and ultimately war. These include ensuring

further redundancy in electronic communications networks, shell protection for certain technical areas for critical infrastructure, increased autonomy in communications networks and the availability of spare parts and auxiliary power in order to maintain capabilities for a longer period of time. The majority of traffic goes through private network owners' networks, which makes it important to strengthen these networks from a total defence perspective. The Government's assessment is that state funding initiatives should be implemented to strengthen the robustness of private network owners' networks in order to achieve a capability that goes beyond that required in a peacetime crisis. This involves, for example, the capability for endurance during protracted sequences of events and to cope with many simultaneous events that are geographically dispersed throughout the country.

PTS has carried out a feasibility study of the needs of total defence for postal services (PTS-ER-2020:23) and notes, among other things, that the agencies and organisations surveyed assess that there is a need for effective handling of physical items of post both in peacetime and during heightened alert, in spite of the increased digitalisation of activities. The Government shares the agency's assessment and sees that work in this area needs to continue.